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ARGUMENT
I.

Grimes Has Failed to Articulate Any Truly Compelling Mitigation, and
the District Court Erred When it Did Not Disbar Him for His
Misappropriation
There is substantial case law in this jurisdiction addressing the appropriate

discipline an attorney should face in cases of misappropriation. That body of
case law, which the OPC cited in its opening Brief, indicates that disbarment is
the presumptive sanction for cases of attorney misappropriation. Appellant's Brief
at 6-9. Grimes concurs with that position in his Brief. Appellee's Brief at 11. The
question, then, is whether the district court based its departure from that
presumption upon "truly compelling mitigation," which is the only standard this
Court has set forth for cases of misappropriation. See In re Ennenga, 2001 UT
111 (Utah 2001); In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); and In re Babilis, 951
P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The OPC asserts that the mitigation Grimes presents,
while unfortunate, does not rise to the level of truly compelling mitigation, and the
district court's downward departure from disbarment was in error.
Much like in the Ennenga case, the district court in this matter found the
correct level of discipline under the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
("Standards"), but then incorrectly used factors of mitigation to justify a downward
departure from the presumption of disbarment. In Ennenga, this Court went
through the offered mitigation and explained why the factors did not rise to the
level of "truly compelling mitigation," required under Babilis. In re Ennenga, 2001
UT at ffij 12-16. That analysis is required in this case as well.
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Grimes argues that the factors of mitigation he presented were
compelling, and were properly used by the district court to depart from the
presumptive sanction of disbarment. Appellee's Brief at 13. The mitigation
Grimes relies upon is detailed in the district court's Order of Sanction. R. 339-41.
Even the district court, which heard and considered Grimes' mitigation first-hand,
did not find that the mitigation constituted truly compelling mitigation. In the
district court's Order of Sanction, the court lists the mitigating factors under Rule
14-607(b) of the Standards immediately after acknowledging that this Court's
guidance in these matters requires a showing of truly compelling mitigation to
depart from a presumptive disbarment. Id. Interestingly, though the district court
recognized that mitigation needed to reach the level of "truly compelling", the
court did not state that any of the mitigation reached that level, and, as the OPC
has argued, ultimately based its departure on an incorrect application of the
Crawley case - not upon a finding that Grimes' mitigation was truly compelling.
Grimes relies upon the following factors of mitigation: Absence of a prior
record; inexperience in the practice of law; personal and emotional problems;
good character or reputation; interim reform; and, remorse. Appellee's Brief at
13-15. Grimes details his personal and financial problems, and suggests that
these pressures exacerbated the underlying misconduct, /of. This Court, however,
has roundly rejected the notion that personal or financial problems rise to the
level of truly compelling mitigation in misappropriation cases. In Ennenga, the
Court stated:
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The trial court also concluded that Ennenga's 'personal and emotional
problems [resulting from] his inability to meet his regular financial
obligations' were mitigating factors. Although we understand that the
pressure of not being able to meet one's financial obligations can be great,
we cannot condone the taking of a client's money to resolve that problem,
even with the intent to return their funds. Personal financial pressures
cannot mitigate the offense of misappropriation.
In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 at ^ 14. Grimes' statements regarding his personal
and financial problems are unfortunate. It is easy to take a sympathetic view
toward those issues, and the OPC believes that the district court adopted such a
view. The interests of justice, however, outweigh the sympathy that the district
court showed Grimes by reducing the presumptive sanction. Though the district
court correctly acknowledged that the only way to justify the departure under this
Court's prior guidance was to find truly compelling mitigation, the court never
used that phrase when discussing Grimes' mitigation. The district court never
referred to the mitigation as truly compelling, compelling or substantial, and in
reading the court's Conclusion, it does not appear that the court used the
Ennenga standard to justify the downward departure in Grimes' sanction. R. 34143.
None of the mitigation rises to the level of truly compelling. Of all the
mitigation, the personal and financial problems are probably the most significant,
and this Court has clearly rejected those factors as rising to the level of truly
compelling mitigation. Despite his arguments to the contrary, Grimes has not
shown truly compelling mitigation, and the district court erred when it did not
disbar Grimes.1
A

In fact, Grimes does not even refer to his mitigation as "truly compelling", and
only refers to the mitigation as "compelling." Appellee's Brief at 13.
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Grimes also attempts to distinguish his case from other cases of
misappropriation, and argues the he didn't take as much money, and his
mitigation is more compelling, so the discipline should not be as severe.
Appellee's Brief at 15-18. Again, the Court addressed a similar argument in
Ennenga, and rejected comparisons as a basis for a downward departure. As the
Court wrote, "the standard for departing from the presumptive sanction of
disbarment is a 'truly compelling' mitigating factor in the circumstances of
Ennenga's case, not the comparative seriousness of other cases." In re
Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 at U 16. Grimes has not been able to articulate a truly
compelling mitigating factor. That is the test for a downwards departure in Utah
misappropriation cases, and the showing cannot be made in this case. That
Grimes took less money than other attorneys who were disbarred for their
misappropriation is not a factor this Court has considered in the past, and should
not be considered now. There isn't a specific dollar amount hurdle for
misappropriation cases, nor should there be. The dishonesty of misappropriating
five dollars from a client is the same as misappropriating thousands. Though the
magnitude of the misappropriation changes from case to case, it is still based
upon the same misconduct, which should not be tolerated in any amount.
II.

The District Court's Reliance Upon the Crawley Decision for A
Misappropriation Case Was in Error
Grimes argues that the district court properly used the Crawley decision

as basis for departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Appellee's
Brief at 21. As Grimes points out, the district court did state the "truly compelling
mitigation test" before listing the mitigating factors in the Order of Sanction. Id. at
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compelling test as the basis for the departure. Grimes acknowledges as much
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mitigating factors only suggests that the court found them compelling. Id. at 22
I his sugyeslimi is in >ullu mill •iml HI*1 ul't,, tinns. mil! IUlitM/n Dial fhn clisi
court used the truly compelling test as a basis for the departure. Rather, the OPC
asserts that the district court was swayed by sympathy for the respondent, and a
misapplication of the Crawley decision.
There is no dispute that the Crawley decision gives wide discretion to the
distrir
that the discretion encouraged under Crawley does not woik to undercut the
clear guidar m

I las pi c > ided iii i attorney misappropriation cases, In

other words, even after Crawley, the "truly compelling mitigation" test is still the
only standard by which a district court may properly deviate from a presumptive
disbarment in a misappropriation case.
It is important to keep in mind that in Crawley, the OPC asked this Court to
ailopl ijunlHiiM11 .iflilfessiiiti whnrn pnikilinn M/UIIM IN

tpptmpiMln in dlnntm,

discipline cases In te Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44 (Utah 2007) at If * ..
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instead explained that it was pleased with • ^

manner in which district courts used tlle flexibility iri tlle Standards to tailor
sanctions to particular cases of misconduct /of. at fl 22. The Court found that in
tl ie Crawley case, the district
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sanction, and well as in the Henderson case (combined with the Crawley case).
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Neither Crawley nor Henderson engaged in misappropriation, but Grimes argues
that Crawley gave the district court the discretion to depart from this Court's
guidance in misappropriation cases. The OPC disagrees.
Nothing in the Crawley case suggests that it applies to, or undermines, the
direction this Court has previously recited in cases of attorney misappropriation.
The OPC asked the Court to provide guidance regarding the use of probationary
periods, and the Court declined to do so. To use that declination to suggest that
district courts no longer need to follow the test of "truly compelling mitigation" for
misappropriation cases goes too far, and overstates the language the Court used
in the Crawley case. There is not any language in the Crawley decision to
indicate that the Court intended the case to upend the established test for
sanctions in misappropriation cases; thus, the OPC believes that Crawley was
improperly relied upon by the district court. We urge this Court to reaffirm the
long line of cases which articulated the "truly compelling mitigation" test, and
disbar Grimes for his misconduct.
CONCLUSION
There is only one test in this jurisdiction which a district court may use to
make a downward departure from presumptive disbarment in misappropriation
cases. The district court referenced that test, but made no finding that Grimes
had factors of mitigation which were truly compelling. It is sometimes easy in
these cases to become sympathetic to the problems attorneys encounter in life.
In many disciplinary cases those problems are properly considered mitigating
factors, and district courts use them to craft sanctions which may help troubled
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attorneys resume practice. This case, however, presents a situation involving the
most serious misconduct an attorney can commit: the misappropriation of client
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may have in less serious cases. As unfortunate as the mitigation offered may be
i

t

court erred by not disbarring Grimes.
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